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In cases of accidental harm, contributory negligence is one of the
two affirmative defenses that tort law has traditionally afforded.' The
contributory negligence defense came into English law at least as early
as 18092 and was an integral part of American negligence doctrine as
espoused in Brown v. Kendall.3 In its orthodox form, the defense com-
pletely bars the plaintiff's recovery.
The last ten years have been a time of turbulence for the contributory
negligence defense. Although comparative negligence is an idea that has
long appealed to scholars, as late as 1968 all but seven states still recog-
nized the defense in its traditional form.4 Suddenly, however, compara-
tive negligence attracted significant support;5 sometime during 1974
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1. The other, of course, is assumption of risk. Contributory negligence is concerned
with the fact that the victim's conduct was unreasonably risky, assumption of risk with
the fact that the victim's conduct was deliberately risky. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463-466, 496 A to 496 G (1965); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1162-1209 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 416-27, 439-57 (4th
ed. 1971). Assumption of risk retains an identity quite distinct from that of contributory
negligence. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 123-24, 127-28 (2d ed. 1977); Mans-
field, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REv. 17, 53-55 (1961); Twerski, Old
Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60
IOWA L. REV. 1, 39-43 (1974).
2. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
3. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850).
4. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 436.
5. Auto liability insurers had traditionally resisted comparative negligence proposals.
But by 1970, with auto no-fault plans looming, many insurers threw their support behind
comparative negligence in an effort to expand the existing liability system so as to make
it less vulnerable to the no-fault challenge. Compare the similar political analysis in
Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 239, 239-40 (1976).
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it became the "majority rule," and it now prevails in at least thirty-
two states." Meanwhile, in cases involving strict products liability most
courts, accepting the guidance of the Second Restatement, have ruled
that inadvertent contributory negligence is no defense at all.7 Typically,
these rulings have come prior to the adoption of comparative negli-
gence. What happens when the rule of comparative negligence, which
makes possible a new sort of compromise, is invoked in products lia-
bility cases is a question that the courts are just beginning to address.8
The 1970s have also witnessed the slow but steady legislative ap-
proval of no-fault plans for automobile insurance.9 These plans have
often been watered down in ways that no-fault's academic sponsors
find unacceptable.' 0 But even these diluted forms of no-fault provide
that the victim's carelessness is irrelevant to his recovery." Moreover,
the debate about no-fault has served as a reminder that for one major
6. Sherman, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 38 U. PITT.
L. REv. 51, 55 (1976). Of the 32 states with comparative negligence as of late 1976, in 29
the change had been effected legislatively. Id.
Comparative negligence exists in "pure" and "modified" forms. Under the pure form,
the plaintiff's recovery is reduced by the proportion of his negligence to the sum of his
negligence and the defendant's. Under the modified form, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced
in this way, but he receives no recovery at all either if he was more negligent than the
defendant or, depending on the variant of the modified form, if he was equally negligent
as the defendant. In most states, comparative negligence exists in one or the other of the
modified forms. Comment, The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act: The Fifty-One
Percent Solution, 50 TEMPLE L.Q. 352, 356-58 (1977).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, Comment n (1965); 2 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[5][tf], at 3B-210 (1977). A few states, including New
York, have resisted this trend and retained the defense in products liability cases. See, e.g.,
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 470 (1973).
The Restatement recognizes an important exception to its general rule: when the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence "consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to en-
counter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,"
the defendant is entitled to a defense. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A, Com-
ment n (1965).
8. Compare Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (rejecting
comparative negligence defense) and Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 335 (Colo. Ct. App.
1976) (same) with Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972)
(accepting comparative negligence defense) and Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (same). Jurisdictions like New York, which have
ruled that contributory negligence applies as a complete defense in strict products lia-
bility, will need to reconsider this holding in light of subsequent enactments of com-
parative negligence. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976). This article will
not discuss the strict liability question.
9. Massachusetts enacted the first no-fault insurance plan in 1970. Twenty-three other
states have since enacted such plans. O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A
Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REv. 23, 26-27 (1977).
10. See, e.g., O'Connell, Letter to the Editor, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1976, at 16, col. 4.
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROaxCTON FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965) launched the
contemporary no-fault movement.
11. J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND 278-84 (1975).
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category of personal injuries-those incurred on the job12-the victim's
carelessness has been irrelevant to his recovery for half a century by
virtue, of course, of workers' compensation."
In addition to these recent changes in the law, a new body of
theoretical writing, examining tort law from an economic perspective,
has both strongly endorsed the idea of a contributory negligence de-
fense14 and highlighted important questions concerning the contribu-
tory negligence issue.' 5 Contemporaneously, England's most interesting
tort scholar has proposed the complete elimination of the defense in all
personal injury negligence cases.'
Instigated by these legal and scholarly developments, this article will
attempt to reassess the question of the contributory negligence defense
by taking into account its economic implications and its psychological
and equitable implications as well. In the article the phrase "contribu-
tory negligence defense" will be used, in its English sense, to refer to
any legal doctrine that affects the plaintiff's recovery on account of his
unreasonable conduct. The phrase is thus broad enough to cover both
the traditional contributory negligence rule and the rule that in this
country is usually called comparative negligence.
The article will contend that economics, standing alone, furnishes no
persuasive basis for any contributory negligence defense, but that such
a basis is adequately provided by reasons of fairness; one of the article's
purposes is to afford the fairness issues a precise formulation. The
article will then proceed to argue that the relevant considerations of
fairness, when combined with appropriate considerations concerning
the psychology of accident prevention, suggest a rule that divides li-
ability between the victim-plaintiff and the injuror-defendant. Com-
parative negligence is, of course, such a rule and seems the appropriate
form of liability division.
I. Negligence Itself
Affirmative tort defenses operate within the framework of the
liability rules against which the defenses are employed. Before dis-
cussing contributory negligence, therefore, it is useful to consider the
12. There were 11 million disabling injuries in the United States in 1974. Of these, 2.3
million (over 20%) were work related. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FAcTS 3 (1975
ed.).
13. See IA A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 30 (1973).
14. E.g., R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 123-24.
15. E.g., Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents: To Fleming James, Jr., 84 YALE
L.J. 656, 662-63 (1975).
16. P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND TIlE LAW 138 (2d ed. 1975).
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concept of negligence, which remains the basic standard of tort lia-
bility.17 Under Judge Hand's Carroll Towing formula,18 accepted by
the Restatement,9 and, via the Restatement, by the courts,20 a de-
fendant's conduct is negligent if it creates a risk of harm that is greater
than the cost of eliminating the risk. Judge Hand quite properly broke
down the risk of harm into two elements: the probability of an accident
and the severity of the injury should an accident occur. He referred to
the cost of prevention as the expense of an appropriate safety device or
"precaution"; it could also include the benefit forgone by giving up
the risky activity in the first place. The Hand formula has often been
flattered as a negligence "calculus." 2' 1 In fact, at its first level the
formula is plainly algebraic and suggests nothing more than an ordinary
cost-benefit analysis. 2 2 In turn, that cost-benefit analysis can be seen,
with the help of one assumption,2 3 as a technique for achieving the
17. Ultrahazardous activity liability and strict products liability are exceptions, of
course. Although ultrahazardous activity liability is interesting theoretically, it is of al-
most no practical importance. Ultrahazardous activity suits are extremely rare: it appears
that not one has been decided by the California Supreme Court, for example, since Luth-
ringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948). Strict products liability does not involve
as great a departure from ordinary principles of negligence as is sometimes supposed. After
all, strict liability requires the showing of a product "defect." In suits against the manu-
facturer, a defect in the product almost always signifies the manufacturer's negligence. See
IV. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 644-49, 671-72 (discussing design defects, warning defects, and
production defects). The issue of the application of comparative negligence to strict prod-
ucts liability calls for careful study. See note 7 supra.
18. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-293 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. Thompson, 111 Ga. App. 654, 657, 143 S.E.2d 51, 53 (1965);
Gelinas v. New England Power Co., 359 Mass. 119, 124, 268 N.E.2d 336, 339 (1971).
The Carroll Towing opinion, celebrated as it is by academics, has had little real-world
influence standing on its own; if Shepard's is correct, Carroll Towing has never been
cited by a single state court.
21. See, e.g., C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 102
(3d ed. 1977).
22. The Hand fornmula seems to assume that the "risk" is unitary. But in most cases
there will be an indefinite number of possible outcomes. Thus, the runaway barge in
Carroll Towing could damage one ship, two ships, three, or four; a ship that is so
damaged might or might not sink; the value of its cargo can be high or low; and so on.
Each of these possible outcomes has its own probability. The total expected risk is the
aggregate of these individual risks, and the aggregating process might assume a calculus-
like character.
23. This assumption is that information or transaction costs hinder a "bargain" between
the parties to allocate the risk. Absent such a condition, the choice of liability rule makes
no difference in accident prevention. See Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability
Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 25-28 (1972). In the personal injury situation, information
and transaction costs are usually high enough to rule out such bargains. Indeed, it is
difficult to point out any "artificial bargains" or "bribes" that have occurred in the real
personal-injury world. Even in ongoing bargaining relationships, unequal information
costs often make the liability rule quite relevant. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at 659;
Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Lia-
bility Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 293, 297-98, 306 (1976).
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economic goal of efficiency-a goal that is concerned with enhancing
society's aggregate welfare. At least in circumstances in which other
things are held equal,2 4 it seems clear enough that efficiency is a posi-
tive social good. Hence economics can be seen to provide a policy basis
for the rule of negligence liability.
The concept of negligence has, of course, been understood his-
torically not only in normative but also in specifically moral terms.
Thus, Brown v. Kendall spoke the morally laden language of "fault,"25
and the identification of negligence with fault has been in the minds
of generations of personal injury lawyers. In recent years, with the
lawyer-economists discovering and expanding on the economic dimen-
sions of the Hand definition of negligence, the impression may have
been created that this definition somehow excludes any ordinary notion
of moral fault.26 But the Hand definition actually suggests a certain
moral understanding of the negligence concept. The risk that makes
the defendant's conduct negligent runs to persons other than the de-
fendant himself. The cost of reducing or preventing the risk, by con-
trast, must usually- 7 be borne by the defendant.28
Assume that the risk can be valued at $100 and that the cost of
preventing the risk is $60. When the defendant fails to incur this cost,
his conduct is judged negligent. By hypothesis, conduct of this sort,
objectively considered, attaches a greater weight to the defendant's own
interests than to the interests of others. It can therefore be regarded as
egoistical or antisocial. 29 Although negligence law does not require the
24. The "other things" can include the so-called "distribution of income" and more
general questions of fairness.
25. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 296.
26. But see Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REv. 757, 777 (1975)
(suggesting that inefficiency is per se "immoral" in public mind).
27. For a case that is interesting exactly because it is unusual, see Cooley v. Public
Serv. Co., 90 N.H. 460, 10 A.2d 673 (1940) (alternative that would avoid risk of injury to
plaintiff would endanger lives of third parties).
28. The extent to which the defendant can "pass on" the cost becomes a complicated
economic question, theoretically and empirically.
29. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.) (negligence is "unsocial"); Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?,
41 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1927) (negligence is "anti-social").
Whether the defendant's negligent conduct is psychologically as well as objectively anti-
social may depend in part on the extent to which the risky conduct is undertaken ad-
vertently; the Hand formula itself seems to presuppose advertent risk-taking. A
psychological assessment of negligent conduct also raises questions about the extent to
which negligence law considers subjective elements. See generally Seavey, supra. Even
Professor Edgerton, the leading "objectivist," agreed in principle that negligence "probably
always involves some mental shortcoming," Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and In-
difference; The Relation of Mental States to Negligence, 39 HARv. L. REV. 849, 858 (1926),
although Edgerton would not equate "mental" with "moral" deficiencies.
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defendant to be altruistic in the sense of self-abnegation, 30 he is required
to place his own welfare and the welfare of others on an equal foot-
ing.31 The conduct that results from his failure to do so is negligent
under the Hand formula. But this is a failure that is also plausibly
reproachable on moral grounds.3 2 In this way the negligence standard-
exactly as it is elucidated by the Hand formula-does possess a recogni-
zable moral content.33
Both the Rational Man of economics and the Reasonable Man of
tort law are associated with the doctrine of negligence liability. Pro-
fessor O'Connell has recently suggested, drawing on the work of
Professor Carrington, that these two Men are similar artifacts.34 Yet
what impresses me most is how far apart these two Men stand. The
Reasonable Man, according to the traditional tort literature, will or-
dinarily behave in a reasonable, nonnegligent way-that is, he will act
with a fair regard for the welfare of others.3  Negligent conduct, which
30. If the cost of risk prevention is $130, the defendant may conclude that his $130 is
worth more than the victim's $100; the defendant therefore is not negligent if he allows
the accident to happen.
31. This analysis, while not necessarily limited to utilitarianism, is consistent with
utilitarian ethics, which express "the sentiment not of altruism but of benevolence, the
agent counting himself neither more nor less than any other person." Smart, An Outline
of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR &
AGAINST 3, 32 (1973).
32. This moral element in negligence has been derived here directly from Judge
Hand's formal definition of negligence. But that element also finds some empirical con-
firmation. Motorists who cause a disproportionate number of road accidents have been
found by psychologists to harbor an aggressive hostility toward the rules and mores of
organized society. See D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN
HIGHWAY CRASHES 132-34 (1970); L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1977, § III, at 9, col. 6 (reporting on
research of Doctors James Weston and Louise Clark). Manufacturers who have been found
guilty of negligence in the creation of unsafe local environments or in the design of their
products have been described as pursuing corporate profit with an unseemly disregard
for community and consumer safety. See G. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976).
Compare Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) with J. O'CONNELL
& A. MYERS, SAFETY LAST 176-79 (1966) (both finding General Motors faulty in design of
Corvair). The Corvair's design remains the subject of debate.
33. In suggesting that there is a fairness basis for negligence liability, I do not mean
to rule out the possibility that there may be justifications for a liability rule that is
stricter than negligence. The fairness aspects of strict liability have been interestingly
discussed in recent years. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972); Keeton,
Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REV. 401 (1959); cf. Williams, A
Critique of Utilitarianism, in J. S.MART & B. WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 77.
In considering negligence, Professor Ronald Dworkin reaches a moral conclusion
similar to mine; he reasons that the Hand formula can be seen as properly balancing
the defendant's interest in "autonomy" against the plaintiff's moral right to "re-
spect." Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1077-78 (1975), reprinted in R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 98-99 (1977).
34. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 199-200 (1975) (discussing Carrington, Book
Review, 1974 U. ILL. L. FORUM 187).
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, Comment e (1965).
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departs from the Reasonable Man standard, is subnormal and deviant,
and this deviancy helps to justify the imposition of the onus of liability.
By comparison, the Rational Man of economics seeks to maximize
his own self-interest and in the usual situation is indifferent to the
welfare of others.36 There is nothing in economics that even intimates
that this self-centered lack of concern is in any way improper. The
Rational Man's lack of concern, however, may cause a divergence be-
tween private cost and social cost that can be economically disadvan-
tageous from a social point of view. By establishing the rule of negli-
gence liability, the law can divert ordinary self-interested conduct so
that it flows in a socially beneficial direction; herein lies the economic
justification for the negligence liability rule.37 Assume that there were
no liability for negligence. The Rational Man would behave negli-
gently, and economics would afford no reason to consider him morally
blameworthy for doing so; the Reasonable Man, by contrast, would
conduct himself in a nonnegligent fashion. Although economic and
traditional tort reasoning thus both reach the result of negligence lia-
bility, the courses of their reasoning, as well as the assumptions about
human behavior in which that reasoning originates, stand in strong
opposition.
II. The Supposed Accident-Prevention Rationale for a Contributory
Negligence Defense
The justification that the new law-and-economics literature offers
for a contributory negligence defense is not at all esoteric or highly
technical; it is easy enough to understand and indeed had been antic-
ipated by traditional tort writings.38 By denying recovery, in whole or
36. Economists indicate that the "self-interest" that people pursue is not necessarily
"selfish" in the lay sense; if an individual happens to derive satisfaction from helping
others, then it is within his self-interest to provide such help. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN,
UNIVERSITY ECONOIfics 24-25 (3d ed. 1972). However, economists generally relegate this
possibility of caring about others to a special section on charity. See, e.g., id. at 148-50.
The "caring" possibility has been essentially ignored in all the economic writings on
personal injury law. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note I; Brown, Toward an Economic
Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Calabresi, supra note 15; Calabresi &
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Chelius,
supra note 23; Chelius, The Control of Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory and Em-
pirical Evidence, 38 L. & CONTE.IP. PROB. 700 (1974); Demsetz, supra note 23; Diamond,
Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974); Oi, On the Economics of Industrial
Safety, 38 L. & CONTEIP. PROB. 669 (1974). By ignoring it, these writings implicitly assume
that people are in fact indifferent to the injuries that their conduct causes others to suffer.
37. This is true if, as has been assumed, see p. 700 supra, information or transaction
costs hinder a bargain between the parties to allocate the risk.
38. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note I, at 53-54, 64, 72. See also Kindt v. Kauffman, 57
Cal. App. 3d 845, 858, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 611-12 (1976) (per curiam).
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in part, to the victim who has been contributorily negligent, the law
can discourage people from engaging in conduct that involves an un-
reasonable risk to their own safety.39 Such "dysfunctional" victim con-
duct is a significant cause of accidents in virtually every major category
of personal injuries with which the law is concerned. (The interesting
exception is injuries resulting from medical malpractice.) Any legal
rule that holds the potential of reducing the incidence of that conduct
deserves our closest attention.
When given such attention, however, the safety-incentive rationale
for contributory negligence becomes problematic. This is so for four
reasons. The first reason is concerned with the difficulty of formulating
an optimal contributory negligence rule; the second, with the limited
effects of such a rule, no matter how formulated; the third, with the
psychological complexities of the conduct that the law criticizes as un-
reasonably risky; and the fourth, with the opportunities of some de-
fendants to prevent contributorily negligent conduct by potential
plaintiffs.
A. An Optimal Contributory Negligence Rule
The economic justification for a contributory negligence defense
runs as follows. Assume a $100 risk that the defendant could prevent
for $60, but that the plaintiff could himself prevent for $25. Although
the defendant may be negligent, the plaintiff is the more efficient ac-
cident preventer. To give the plaintiff the incentive to spend this $25,
the plaintiff should be the party who is "liable"-that is, a doctrine of
contributory negligence should require him to bear the $100 loss.
Although hypotheticals of this sort seem to support some version of
a contributory negligence rule, they clearly do not support the rule in
its traditional form. Assume a reversal of the $60/$25 figures: the
plaintiff can prevent the risk for $60, the defendant for only $25. Al-
though the plaintiff is contributorily negligent, the defendant should
be held liable, since the defendant is in the better position to eliminate
the risk. These converse results can be reconciled into a single con-
tributory negligence rule: the plaintiff's contributory negligence should
bar his recovery if, but only if, the plaintiff's prevention costs were
lower than the defendant's. 40 Although this rule contemplates a com-
39. See R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 123-24; Demsetz, supra note 23, at 27.
In light of this justification, workers' compensation has been questioned or criticized
for its failure to attach legal consequences to the employee's contributory negligence. See
Chelius, supra note 36, at 708-09; Oi, supra note 36, at 679.
40. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at 662-63; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 36, at
Vol. 87: 697, 1978
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parison of the negligence of the plaintiff and defendant, it does not
amount to customary comparative negligence, since it is an either/or
liability rule that does not involve the division of damages between the
two parties.41 It somewhat resembles the Galena rule, which flourished
for a few years in nineteenth century Illinois, 42 and for the sake of
convenience, it will be referred to as the Galena rule hereafter.
Although the Galena rule avoids the problem of barring recovery by
a plaintiff whose prevention costs were higher than the defendant's, it
is beset by other problems, several of which it shares with the liability-
dividing rule of comparative negligence. Consider, for example, the
situation in which the defendant could prevent the risk for $60, and
the plaintiff for $65-but in which the risk could also be prevented if
the plaintiff and defendant took complementary measures that would
cost the defendant $9 and the plaintiff $10. This combined cost of $19
is the least expensive way to prevent the risk. Yet the Galena rule
would give the plaintiff no incentive to take the $10 measure, since
pursuant to Galena the fact that the defendant's prevention costs are
lower than the plaintiff's (under either prevention alternative) means
that the defendant will bear the entire liability. A liability-dividing
rule of comparative negligence would encourage the complementary
measures: 43 the plaintiff and the defendant, each facing a liability in
the vicinity of $50, would be willing to spend $10 and $9 to avoid that
liability.
When the cheapest means of prevention are independent rather than
complementary, however, comparative negligence can sometimes be
successful, but only on a fortuitous basis. When, for example, one
party's prevention costs are $25 and the other's $60, the party with the
lower costs will face an expected liability of either $65 or $70, depend-
ing on the method of calculation, 44 and will rationally spend $25 to
1058; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STuD. 29, 40 (1972). See also Brown,
supra note 36, at 329.
41. So-called "modified" comparative negligence is a compromise between pure com-
parative negligence and the rule discussed here. Under modified comparative negligence,
the plaintiff recovers proportionately if he is "less" negligent than the defendant, but
recovers nothing if he is "more" negligent. See note 6 supra. From the present discussion
of the alternatives of pure comparative negligence and the rule discussed here, appropriate
lessons can be drawn concerning the modified hybrid.
42. Galena & Chicago Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858).
Professor Chelius seems unaware that Galena is not the traditional rule of contributory
negligence. Chelius, supra note 23, at 296-97.
43. Cf. G. CALABRESi, TnE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS 158 (1970) (showing how similar result
could be achieved under rule allocating liability by involvement in accident).
44. There are two ways in which the negligence of the plaintiff and defendant could
be compared. First, one could compare prevention costs. For example, if one party could
have prevented the accident for $10 and the other party for $40, the $10 party would bear
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prevent the risk. Meanwhile, the party with the $60 costs, facing an
expected liability of only $30 or $35, will not spend $60 to prevent the
risk. In such a case, comparative negligence produces the right result.
But now assume that the risk can be prevented either by the plaintiff
for $70 or by the defendant for $68. This is a risk that it would be
efficient to eliminate. Yet under comparative negligence the do-nothing
plaintiff and the do-nothing defendant each face a liability in the
vicinity of $50; each will therefore abstain from preventive measures
and allow the risk to materialize. 4.
Finally, assume that the risk could be prevented by one party for $10
or by the other party for $20. Since under comparative negligence both
parties will face liabilities in excess of their prevention costs, either
party would be impelled to engage in risk prevention, which would
lead to duplication and hence to wasted expenditure. 4 Of course, if the
$20 party correctly predicts that comparative negligence will motivate
the $10 party to pay for prevention, the former party will neglect his
own $20 option, and the desired result will be obtained. But by the
same token, if the $10 party correctly predicts that comparative negli-
gence will lead the $20 party to incur the safety expenditure, the $10
party will abstain. In this latter circumstance, duplication is avoided,
but the more costly of the two "independent" solutions results. Worse
yet, each party may predict that comparative negligence will induce the
a liability four times as great as the $40 party. Each party's share of the total liability
would then be determined by the formula:
(total prevention costs)-(party's prevention costs)
Party's share of liability = total prevention costs
Alternatively, one could compare the net losses that the parties incurred by their failure
to take preventive measures, that is, the differences between each party's prevention costs
and the expected value of the risk that each allowed to materialize. Thus, if the expected
value of the risk is $100 and the respective prevention costs are again S40 and $10, those
differences are $60 and $90, respectively. The $40 party and $10 party would then bear
liability in the ratio of 60/90. The liability of each party would be determined by the
formula:
= (expected value of risk)-(party's prevention costs)
Party's share of liability -2 X (expected value of risk).(total prevention costs)
As these examples suggest, the two methods of comparison yield different results. The
variation is especially dramatic when the difference between the prevention costs of the
two parties is either a very great or a very small proportion of the prevention costs them-
selves. Thus, if the expected value of the risk is $100, and the prevention costs are $1 and
$4, the first method would divide liability 80%/20%, whereas the second method would
divide liability 51%/49%. Similarly, if prevention costs were $96 and S98, the two divisions
of liability would be 51%/49% and 67%/33%.
45. Cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 158 (showing how similar problem would arise
under rule allocating liability by involvement in accident).
46. R. POSNER, supra note I, at 124.
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other party to prevent; if so, neither will himself prevent, and the un-
economical risk will occur.47 In fact, given this entire "prediction"
procedure, each party has an incentive to "bluff" inaction so as to
persuade the other that it is in his economic interest to incur the
safety expenditure.
Thus comparative negligence, although appropriate in situations in
which complementary accident prevention is desirable, offers no as-
surance of the right result in those situations in which independent
prevention is required. Of course, the law could adopt a two-level rule
that applies Galena to independent-action cases while retaining com-
parative negligence for complementary-action cases. But it would be
extremely difficult to make these characterizations after the accident
and more vexing still to make them before the event, which is of course
the relevant time if the rule is to achieve its purposes in influencing the
actors' conduct.
In any event, several other problems afflict both Galena and com-
parative negligence and would remain even if the two rules could
somehow be accommodated. In the $60/$25 hypothetical used to illus-
trate the Galena rule, assume that the opportunities to take preventive
measures are sequential in time and that the $25 opportunity occurs
first. If the plaintiff is the $25 preventer, the Galena rule would
recognize his contributory negligence as a complete defense. But people
often make mistakes, and the plaintiff may fail to incur the $25 ex-
pense. Once the plaintiff has so erred, the goal of efficiency suggests
that liability be returned to the defendant; with the plaintiff's $25
opportunity squandered, the defendant's $60 measure is the best way
to prevent the risk. This suggests a rule akin to the rule of last clear
chance-one that would eliminate all effects of the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence. Now reverse the parties, so that the defendant's $25
opportunity precedes the plaintiff's $60 opportunity; the idea can
here be developed of last clear chance running against the plaintiff,
47. To provide full incentives for both the plaintiff and the defendant, it has been
suggested that the negligent plaintiff and the negligent defendant should each be held
fully liable: the defendant should be required to make a full-damage payment, but the
payment should be retained by the state rather than turned over to the plaintiff. See R.
Knoeber, Legal Penalties and Compensation for Auto Accidents (unpublished Ph.D. thesis
for the University of California, Los Angeles, 1976). An intriguing idea, this. But whatever
it is, it is not tort law. (Knoeber would not disagree; indeed, he advances his proposal
within a public-law rather than a tort-law framework.) And it is impossible to see how
the proposal would not lead to excessive, redundant expenditures. For example, where
one party could prevent a I00 risk for 560 and the other party for $25, the proposal
would encourage both of them to expend for prevention, in an unnecessary way.
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thus reinstating his contributory negligence as a complete defense. 4s
With either of these last clear chance rules, however, the party with the
earlier opportunity, knowing of the rule, might deliberately err 49 so as
to shift the safety expense to the party with the subsequent opportunity.
Since the party acting first was assumed to have the lower safety costs,
the possibility of such strategems perplexes the efficiency of the two-
fold last clear chance rule. Moreover, in those situations in which com-
plementary safety measures are most efficient and in which compara-
tive negligence therefore has immediate appeal, there are related last
clear chance issues that are equally complicated.5°
Additionally, if a two-fold last clear chance rule were adopted, there
would be major difficulties in working out its elements. What fact
would "trigger" the rule: simply that the first party has squandered his
opportunity, or instead that the second party knows (or has reason to
know) of this squandering? What if the first party's error, although
commencing early, is of a continuing nature-that is, it consists of
inattentiveness that remains capable of being corrected at any moment
before the accident? Tort lawyers will of course find these questions
familiar; they involve the variables that are incorporated into our
existing and more limited rule of last clear chance. In this regard, it
may be noted that the existing rule, because of the confusions that
48. The framework also fits the typical products liability case. When the consumer
actually learns of the product defect before using it, the sequential considerations seem
all the stronger. Products liability does recognize a hybrid contributory-negligence/assump-
tion-of-risk defense when the consumer unreasonably continues to use the product after
detecting the defect. See note 7 supra.
49. For example, trichinosis in pork can be prevented either by the farmer (by the
proper feeding of pigs) or by the consumer (by cooking pork to an internal temperature
of 137 degrees). See 29 RuTERs L. REV. 466, 472 (1976). Should a rule of last clear chance
running against plaintiffs be recognized, the farmer would be relieved of any tort in-
centive to engage in nonnegligent feeding. In general, such a rule would vastly weaken
the safety incentihe that tort law now places on product manufacturers, since a large per-
centage of all product accidents involves the carelessness of the product user.
The problem of the deliberate error could possibly be dealt with by giving the second
party who is required to incur a safety expenditure (say, of $60) a cause of action against
a first party who has failed to expend a smaller sum (say, $25). This cause of action-
which, of course, would in no way depend on the risk materializing in an actual injury-
would be for some figure no less than -25 and no greater than $60. The substantial public
and private costs that would be involhed in the processing of such small claims seem to
rule them out as an effective solution to the deliberate error problem. In some cases, a
single failure to spend for prevention by a first party (e.g., a manufacturer) would impose
prevention requirements on thousands of second parties (e.g., consumers). To allow the
second parties' suits against the first party, an elaborate class-action device would be
required.
50. Assume that the S100 risk can be prevented by sequential, complementary measures
of $10 or by either party acting alone at S40. Once the first party has missed his SIO op-
portunity, it becomes efficient to abandon comparative negligence and place full liability
on the second party. Once again, the specter of the deliberate error haunts the scene.
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those variables breed, has proven to be about the shaggiest and least
satisfactory doctrine in all of tort law.51
A further problem afflicting both Galena and comparative negligence
concerns their implicit assumptions about each party's awareness of
the other's prevention possibilities. Assuming a party who could pur-
chase safety for $60, Galena would advise him to do so if, but only if,
the other party's safety costs are greater than $60. This is advice on
which the party can take action only if he has knowledge of what the
other party's safety costs actually are. Under comparative negligence,
what each party is intended to do similarly depends on his knowledge
of the other party's prevention costs. Now in some situations, one
party has or can easily obtain adequate knowledge of the other party's
safety circumstances; but in other situations, this knowledge will be
difficult or impossible to acquire. Lacking this knowledge, neither rule
can give the parties the guidance they need if they are to make the
balanced, efficient decisions that the rules expect. In the economists'
terms, the safety arguments on behalf of both Galena and comparative
negligence presuppose that the cost of obtaining a certain kind of in-
formation is very low. In fact, however, this information often will be
quite costly to obtain and frequently will simply be unavailable in any
practical sense.52
51. See, e.g., County of Maricopa v. Maberry, 555 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying
Arizona law); Peterson v. Burkhalter, 38 Cal. 2d 107, 237 P.2d 977 (1951).
In its comparative negligence decision, the California Supreme Court was eager to
abrogate last clear chance. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872 (1975).
52. A related problem concerns the feasibility of the quantifications upon which all of
the foregoing analysis depends. Even if the plaintiff and the defendant know that ac-
cidents can be prevented either by the plaintiff doing x or by the defendant doing y, they
may not be able to calculate accurately the cost of x and y. Without this ability, neither
Galena nor comparative negligence can accurately achieve its desired results. Of course,
even the Carroll Towing definition of negligence assumes that the defendant can quantify
both the risk and the cost of eliminating the risk. But any doctrine of contributory negli-
gence adds to the number of quantifications that the parties must perform and to that
extent is unattractive.
Two final complications are added by the use of the jury. First, to the extent that the
jury estimates the costs of accidents and of prevention imperfectly, neither Galena nor
comparative negligence can be fully successful. An ad hoc lay jury is more likely than a
professional judge to allow perceptions to be distorted by the lens of hindsight; and ac-
cording to the traditional understanding of lawyers, tort juries are swayed by a pro-
plaintiff bias. But see Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1063-66,
1072-74 (1964). Second, the decisions of juries may be erratic as well as inaccurate. Juries
decide cases-often with the judge's encouragement by way of amorphous instructions-
on the basis of lay instincts. To the extent that parties cannot predict how a jury will
decide, they cannot shape their conduct in the way that will render it consistent with
the jury's judgment. Of course, even the simple rule of negligence liability requires the
jury to make up its mind on the issue of the defendant's negligence. But again, any
contributory negligence rule increases the ntmber of judgments that the jury will be
required to reach.
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What the previous analysis adds up to is this: in thinking about
contributory negligence, the starting assumption is the negligence of
the defendant-that is, that the defendant could efficiently have
eliminated the risk. The point behind contributory negligence is that
the plaintiff may have been an efficient risk preventer as well. This
point is a relevant one, in the sense that insofar as the analysis has been
accurate in its understanding of plaintiff conduct,c3 negligence law
without any contributory negligence defense would fail to achieve full
efficiency. However, the effort to develop a defense that will take the
plaintiff's conduct into account runs up against a wide range of serious
theoretical and practical obstacles. Although the absence of any con-
tributory negligence rule may be inefficient, the traditional rule of
contributory negligence as a complete defense seems equally inefficient.
And when their numerous complications are duly considered, in-
termediate rules like Galena and comparative negligence cannot neces-
sarily be counted on to produce any net reduction in this inefficiency.
To be sure, none of these assessments establishes that a contributory
negligence defense decreases efficiency; rather, they weaken the claim
that such a defense produces positive results. When recognition is given
to relevant complexities of the accident situation, an economic analysis
of the contributory negligence issue is unable to yield any determinate
formula.
B. Limited Effects of a Contributory Negligence Rule
The rhetoric in the discussion above has referred to an accident that
either of two parties may be able to prevent; liability rules were
justified in terms of their ability to induce appropriate preventive
measures. That rhetoric may have been misleading in its failure to
make clear that the plaintiff is the biological victim of the accident.
Hence the plaintiff has a strong "first-party" incentive to prevent the
accident without regard to tort liability rules. Of course, to the extent
that the injured victim can secure a recovery from a negligent de-
fendant, he can transfer to another his original accident costs. It can
therefore be argued that absent a contributory negligence defense, the
victim's opportunity to collect in tort eliminates his original incentive
to behave in a reasonably safe way. This argument, however, rests on
several assumptions that are valid only in part.
To be deterred by a contributory negligence rule, the victim must
first of all know and understand both the general rule and its relevant
53. That understanding is questioned at pp. 713-19 infra.
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applications. Yet studies have shown that a substantial portion of the
public lacks such an understanding.54 Since victims tend to be private
citizens who have never before been in a tort situation, this lack of
understanding is not surprising.
Second, the original incentive to act carefully can be affected by tort
rules only to the extent that the potential victim can predict that his
injury will occur in circumstances indicating the tort liability of some
other party. In some cases, this knowledge exists or can easily be ob-
tained. Thus, the employee considering on-the-job carelessness knows
or should know that his employer will be liable for an accident. But
consider the pedestrian who jaywalks. This pedestrian may be hit by a
car that is being driven negligently or that has been defectively de-
signed. But for all the pedestrian knows, the colliding driver and car
will be free of any basis for tort liability. To the extent that the victim
cannot predict that his accident will involve the tort liability of another
party, his original incentive for careful conduct remains fully in effect.
Now lei us assume that the victim's injury is caused by the negligence
of the defendant. Even if, despite his contributory negligence, the vic-
tim is given all the damages that the law allows, those damages will
usually fall considerably short of compensating him for the full cost
of his accident. For instance, whenever there is any real doubt about
either the existence of liability or the quantum of damages, the victim
will feel required to secure the services of a lawyer. Given the terms
of the customary contingent fee arrangement, even the successful plain-
tiff thus goes uncompensated off the top, so to speak, for one-third of
his legal loss. Moreover, the victim who files a tort claim subjects him-
self to the miseries of litigation, which can involve time costs and very
real emotional costs.r Finally, for some victims tort damages rules do
not even purport to be fully compensatory in the sense of leaving the
victim "indifferent" to the fact of the original accident.50 The victim
who is subjected to intense pain and suffering, for example, can expect
a substantial recovery, but not one large enough to leave him indif-
ferent to his pain in all its intensity.5 7 Tort law, mindful that any such
54. See J. O'CONNELL & IV. WILSON, CAR INSURANCE AND CONSU.MER DESIRES 12-13 (1969).
55. Consider Learned Hand's conclusion, based on "some dozen years of experience,"
that "as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness
and death." L. Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, re-
printed in D. LoUISELL 8, G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
1294, 1295 (3d ed. 1973).
56. On the importance of an "indifference" standard for tort law's damage rules, see
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 32 (1960); Demsetz, supra note 23, at
27.
57. In many cases it would be vulgar to suggest that any sum of money could produce
indifference. See, e.g., Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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recovery would approach the infinite, has rather deliberately rejected
the indifference measure for pain and suffering damagesas Likewise,
when the accident threatens to take the life of its victim, that potential
victim obviously holds no belief that he will be compensated, after the
accident, in a way that will leave him indifferent to the fact of his
death. 59
A potential victim thus faces a combination of factors: a contingent
fee, other personal costs of litigation, the limits of tort law's damage
rules,60 and his frequent inability to predict a liability-bearing de-
fendant. Given this combination, any potential victim will rationally
conclude that, irrespective of any right of his to recover in tort, he will
predictably end up burdened with a substantial fraction of the original
cost of his ccident. Assume the situation of a person confronting a
$100 risk, where there is a sixty percent chance of a defendant whom
tort law would hold liable, where tort damages will compensate him for
eighty percent of his expected loss, and where one-third of his recovery
will be retained by his lawyer. In these circumstances, the real value of
a recovery in tort is only $32. If, therefore, the person can prevent the
risk at a cost less than $68, he will have a first-party incentive to do so,
even if tort rules allow him to recover without regard to his contribu-
tory negligence. Thus even absent a contributory negligence defense,
the potential victim retains a substantial incentive to abstain from
contributorily negligent conduct.
This intermediate assessment rejects, as overstatement, the claim in
many tort books that it is "irrational" for potential victims to take ac-
count of the implications of a contributory negligence rule.,' Also, the
assessment does not profess to establish that a contributory negligence
defense is actually inefficient. It rather suggests that the safety purposes
that the defense is alleged to achieve can be achieved, at least to a
substantial extent, without the defense.
58. See, e.g., Horn v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 61 Cal. 2d 602, 609, 394 P.2d 561, 565, 39
Cal. Rptr. 721, 725 (1964); Heddles v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 74 Wis. 239, 259, 42 N.W.
237, 243 (1889).
59. No criticism of the law is intended here. It is obviously impossible to design any
mechanism that can provide after-the-fact compensation to the victim of a fatal accident.
60. Are there offsetting numbers of overcompensated tort victims? Studies finding
that victims of minor accidents are "overcompensated" by the tort system reach this
conclusion only by slighting the victim's nonmonetary losses. See, e.g., STATE OF NEW YORK
INSURANCE DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE . . . FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 27 (1970). Many "soft
tissue" victims whose out-of-pocket losses are low are probably grossly undercompensated.
Additionally, the studies referred to are typically limited to highway accidents, with
respect to which almost any claim has a monetary "nuisance value." It is by no means
clear that similar patterns of recovery prevail among other classes of accident victims, e.g.,
those injured in medical accidents or by products.
61. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 16, at 512; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 433.
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C. Psychological Aspects of Contributorily Negligent Conduct
The weaknesses uncovered so far in the safety-incentive rationale for
a contributory negligence defense have not impugned the usefulness of
an economic analysis of the contributory negligence problem or of
legal problems generally; they have suggested instead that the rationale
is flawed even from a strictly economic perspective. A third reason for
rejecting the rationale-which may suggest limitations on the value of
economic assumptions-is concerned with the psychological implica-
tions of the widespread social phenomenon of contributorily negligent
conduct, conduct that is unreasonably risky to the actor.
It is clear beyond doubt that such conduct has been extremely com-
mon in the past and remains quite common in those states in which
contributory negligence continues as a complete defense to a suit in
tort.6 2 Moreover, unreasonably risky conduct is extensive even in situa-
tions in which there is no conceivable tort defendant: consider all the
people who injure themselves in countless ways around the house.
Economics postulates the Rational Man-the man who acts intelligently
to pursue his goals. But how can this model of the Rational Man cope
with all the behavior that is unreasonably risky to oneself? 3 How can
it explain motorists who drive across well-marked railroad crossings
without slowing down, or looking, or listening; 64 people who, although
entirely aware of the lethal danger, nevertheless allow themselves to
come into contact with dangling power lines; 65 pedestrians who jay-
walk into the path of cars that they know are approaching; 66 persons
who walk into (or put their heads into) elevator shafts,6 7 or who for no
apparent reason enter strange rooms that are pitched in darkness;
68
motorists who drink themselves into inebriation;6 9 auto passengers who
involve themselves in drinking bouts with their driver-hosts; 70 persons
62. See, e.g., West v. Baltimore 8- O.R.R., 528 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1975) (applying West
Virginia law).
63. In all of the cases cited in footnotes 64-72 infra, recovery was wholly denied because
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. Such cases are chosen to counter the idea that
the availability of a tort recovery encouraged or explains the plaintiff's unreasonably risky
conduct. Of course, I do not claim that just because the plaintiffs in these particular cases
were not deterred, it follows that the rule of contributory negligence never deters.
64. Newport V. Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry., 509 F.2d 1246 (6th Cir. 1975); Perry v.
Gulf M. & 0. R.R., 502 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1974).
65. Dorough v. Alabama Power Co., 200 Ala. 605, 76 So. 963 (1917); Thomas v. Gulf
States Utils. Co., 128 So. 2d 323 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
66. Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1976).
67. Schwartz v. Paul Tishman Co., 147 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Hucaluk v. Clyde
Realty Co., 378 Pa. 169, 106 A.2d 829 (1954).
68. Gibson v. Lamesa Cotton Oil Co., 178 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1950); Greelish v. New
York Cent. R.R., 286 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 1965).
69. Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976).
70. Waltanen %,. Wiitala, 361 Mich. 501, 105 N.W.2d 400 (1960).
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who accept a ride in a private airplane from an obviously drunken
pilot; 71 purchasers of a product who, realizing it lacks a vital safety
device that supposedly comes with the product, use the product for
years without even mentioning the matter to their local retailer?72
The answer, I think, is that the economic model of the Rational Man
can cope with this conduct only in part; much of this conduct resists
being interpreted as entirely "rational" in economic terms.73 If, how-
ever, economists find such conduct difficult to comprehend it poses few
mysteries for the rest of us. As laymen, we readily accept the fact that
people often behave in foolish ways with respect to risks they en-
counter. Among professional psychologists, the accident-causing be-
havior of accident victims has been a prime subject of research for a
half-century.7 4 This psychological literature, which is rich and diverse,
has uncovered many significant correlations. With respect to age, for
example, studies show that the work-accident rate is highest during the
teens and early twenties; then, after a plateau in the mid-twenties, the
rate declines until the mid-forties, when it begins a steady rise that lasts
until retirement.7 5 Correlations such as these must be carefully in-
terpreted, of course; youth is in part a proxy for inexperience, age for
declining physical dexterity. 6 Often, however, the correlations do in-
dicate causation. Thus, it is established that "inattention" results in
accidents-and there is a considerable psychological literature on the
causes of inattention.7 7 "Fatigue," for example, is naturally conducive
to inattention;78 hence conditions that produce fatigue can be regarded,
at least in a general way, as causes of accidents.
In suggesting that psychology rather than economics may best help
us to understand contributorily negligent conduct, I do not claim that
71. Adair v. Valley Flying Serv., 196 Ore. 479, 250 P.2d 104 (1952).
72. Baker v. Rosemurgy, 4 Mich. App. 195, 144 N.W.2d 660 (1966).
73. See the statement of the economist Robert Solow that the economist's assumption
of rational choice is "free of deep psychology, free of social institutions .... Naturally, it
turns Freudians purple and sociologists green." Solow, Science and Ideology in Economics,
PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1970, at 94. See also Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 474 (1974).
74. Extremely useful is A. HALE & 'M. HALE, A REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL AccIDEXT
RESEARCH LITERATURE (1972), a book that, its title notwithstanding, deals with all studies
of road accidents as well as work accidents. See also M. SCHULZINGER, THE ACCIDENT
SYNDROME (1956); L. SHAW & H. SICHEL, ACCIDENT PRONENESS (1971).
75. See A. HALE & N1. HALE, supra note 74, at 33-34.
The evidence on vision is mixed. Id. at 40-41. What evidence there is on deafness sug-
gests that it is associated with lower accident rates. Id. at 41. The relevance of sensori-
motor performance is now unsettled. Id. at 43-45. And "above a very low minimum, there
is no overall relationship between intelligence test results and accidents." Id. at 50.
76. Id. at 42.
77. See J. COHEN & B. PRESTON, CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF ROAD ACCIDENTS 55 (1968).
78. A. HALE & MN. HALE, sulnva note 74, at 45.
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such conduct is impervious to the influence of either legal rules gen-
erally or a contributory negligence rule in particular. The psychological
literature does not now support the idea, once advanced by Professor
Fleming James,7 0 that a large percentage of all accidents is caused by a
small number of accident-prone persons, who are identifiable in ad-
vance and whose accident proneness is due to stable and innate at-
tributes, many of which are physical or quasi-physical.80 Rather, what
I mean to claim is that prevention may be a matter less of economic
theory and more of applied psychology. Here, however, there is a mis-
fortune to report: the question of how to prevent unreasonably self-
risky conduct is one that applied psychologists have until now largely
overlooked. 8' In an effort to think about the question of prevention in
a psychologically realistic way (though without much help from the
psychological literature), it seems helpful to break up the whole of
contributorily negligent conduct into two categories.
The first of these covers situations in which the individual is aware
of the risk. 2 But merely to describe such a category raises the question
of why anyone would choose to engage in conduct of this sort. At least
three reasons are identifiable.8 3 First, on the basis of the facts as he
perceives them, the person may have concluded that the risk involved
in his conduct is reasonable.8 4 He is wrong in his judgment because his
facts are wrong; he has either undercalculated the risk or over-
calculated the cost of abjuring the risky conduct.85 Second, on the basis
of the values that the individual holds, he may conclude that his con-
79. James & Dickenson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REV. 769
(1950). See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 1, at 3-4 (Supp. 1968).
80. See A. HALE & M. HALE, supra note 74, at 21-23; L. SHAW & H. SICHEL, supra note
74, at 420-21; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND ACCIDENT INVOLVE-
MENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY 95-99 (1970).
It is unfortunate that the legal consideration of accident psychology was so early tied
by Professor James's work to the dubious accident-proneness hypothesis.
81. See Hinrichs, Psychology of Man at Work, 21 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 519, 544 (1970).
82. In such situations contributory negligence "overlaps" with the assumption of risk
defense. The discussion in the text deals with the contributory negligence aspect only.
83. These reasons are in addition, of course, to the economic reason that the actor's
knowledge of the defendant's tort liability reduces the actor's foreseeable net costs to the
point at which the risky conduct becomes rational from the actor's point of view. The
possibility of conduct occasioned in this way can hardly be gainsaid; however, it is difficult
to document the existence of any such conduct, even anecdotally.
The burden of the text is to establish that there are many explanations for deliberately
and unreasonably self-risky conduct that are independent of the economic net costs argu-
ment.
84. See, e.g., Froom v. Butcher, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 379, 386 (C.A.) (plaintiff under-
calculated safety benefits of wearing seat belts).
85. This may be due to information costs or to the fact that the plaintiff is not in-
telligent enough to calculate the risk accurately. Economic analysis often assumes-without
providing justification-that people possess a high and uniform intellectual ability. See,
e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 72-73 (lst ed. 1973).
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duct is reasonable. If the law deems his behavior negligent, it does so
because the community (viz., the jury) adheres to a different set of
values. Consider the victim who walks into a dark, unknown room be-
cause he is unusually curious", and places an unusually high value on
the satisfaction of his curiosity, or the "risk-preferring" victim who is
willing to jaywalk partly because he does not really mind (or even
enjoys) dodging cars. Third, the victim may be one of those persons who
are psychologically inclined to believe that accidents happen only to the
"other guy," and who, in the face of known risks, are therefore likely to
make decisions that are not genuinely consistent with their own real
interests.8 7
What happens when a contributory negligence defense is imposed
on unreasonably and deliberately risky conduct that can be explained
in any of these ways? For the victim with the wrong facts, it is not clear,
as a matter of law, that his conduct entails contributory negligence at
all. Even if the victim's factual perceptions are objectively incorrect, so
long as they fall within the bounds of "reasonableness" the victim will
perhaps be regarded as having behaved as a "reasonable man" and
hence as not guilty of contributory negligence.88 Next, in the case of
the victim with atypical values, 0 it is hardly clear that his is conduct
that society should really want to prevent. Certainly, the economist
would not automatically argue in favor of prevention. Economics is
keen on leaving to each individual the right to define and determine
his goals; the economic assumption of rationality relates to choices that
the person makes in pursuing his goals.00 Finally, for conduct oc-
86. E.g., Carns v. Noel, 364 Pa. 77, 70 A.2d 619 (1950).
87. Professor Calabresi refers to the tendency both to believe that accidents happen to
"the other guy" and to overvalue current gratification that is gained at possible future
cost. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 55-57. Professor Gerald Dworkin notices addi-
tional factors: human difficulty in translating "intellectual knowledge" about risks into
knowledge that is "subjectively genuine," and lack of "will power," which prevents people
from acting in ways consistent with their knowledge. Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY
AND THE LAw 107, 120-22 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971).
88. Compare Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42-43 (1915) with Froom v.
Butcher, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 379, 384 (C.A.). If tort law does allow the jury to find con-
tributory negligence in such cases, one cannot be terribly confident that the jury rather
than the plaintiff has made the more appropriate assessment, especially since the jury's
judgment is made with the detriment of hindsight. Also, unless the plaintiff is aware that
his factual assessment is not shared by others, he will have no reason to believe that
contributory negligence is even an issue.
89. For such a plaintiff, it seems clear that the community's values, rather than the
plaintiff's, prevail. See Seavey, supra note 29, at 10-11. See also Sullivan v. Creed, [1904] 2
I. R. 317 (K.B.), reprinted in C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at
204 (on role of jury).
90. See G. BECKER, ECONOTIC THEORY 25-26 (1971). Of course, when justification for
the plaintiff's risky conduct is couched in terms of the plaintiff's atypical values, it can
be argued that an affirmative defense remains appropriate, on the grounds that the law
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casioned by psychological deficiencies, there is at least a possibility that
an individual's knowledge of the contributory negligence implications
of his behavior might reinforce his lagging self-disciplineY1 The
problem is that the magnitude of this possibility is very difficult to
figure out; the incentive afforded by a contributory negligence rule
may well be effective occasionally, but more than this one cannot say.
The second category of contributorily negligent conduct includes
instances in which the victim, because of inattention or inadvertance,
is not conscious of the risk. This category includes a large percentage of
all contributorily negligent conduct. In some of these situations, the
victim's conduct is barely even deliberate: consider the worker whose
hand finds its way into a dangerous machine and who is utterly un-
able to explain how this came to pass.92 More commonly, the person's
behavior will be intentional but undertaken without awareness of the
risk: consider the person who momentarily forgets about a dangerous
condition as he walks ahead.9 3 Either way, the individual is mindless
of the risk. Starting with this fact of mindlessness, the conclusion
easily follows that liability rules like contributory negligence, which
themselves appeal to the mind, will have little effect. For that matter,
such conduct, in light of its mindlessness, does not seem readily con-
trollable by direct public regulation," nor even by the supposedly all-
powerful "instinct of self-preservation."
wishes to "keep the plaintiff honest" by denying him a recovery-i.e., to rule out the
possibility that the plaintiff finds his conduct reasonable only because he expects he can
shift part of its cost to a tort defendant. This argument is -unconvincing, so long as we
start with the assumption of a negligent defendant. Given the assumed certainty of a
defendant who is an efficient cost-preventer, it seems a mistake to deny or reduce the
plaintiff's recovery because of the mere possibility that the plaintiff is an efficient cost-
preventer as well.
91. If, for example, the failure to wear seat belts were deemed contributory negligence,
I would be somewhat better able to discipline myself to wear them. Professor Gerald
Dworkin describes his own seat belt behavior in similar terms. Dworkin, supra note 87,
at 121.
92. E.g., Elder v. Crawley Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
93. E.g., Wood v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 100 Ala. 660, 13 So. 552 (1893); Day v. Barber-
Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956).
94. Particular sub-doctrines of contributory negligence law seem consistent with this
observation. "Momentary forgetfulness" is generally held not to be contributory negli-
gence per se, but only a factor for the jury to consider. See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 2d 950,
953, 954-55 (1960). In England, "momentary inadvertence" is not contributory negligence
at all in suits by employees against employers. J. MUNKMAN, EMPLOYERS LIABILITY AT COM-
MON LAW 586-87 (8th ed. 1971). See also the disqualification of ordinary contributory
negligence as a defense in products liability cases, note 7 supra, as explained in 86 HARV.
L. REV. 923, 929-31 (1973).
95. Professor Calabresi refers to some risky acts-for example, a driver's absentmindedly
taking his eyes off the road-that cannot be dealt with by regulations, since they are acts
that "individuals cannot control." G. CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 109-11.
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It is possible, however, that conduct that is mindless in the im-
mediate sense can be understood, from a longer-term perspective, as
flowing from an individual's general decision about how much "care"
or "attention" to exercise in his day-to-day affairs. Such a decision
would balance the benefit of attention (that is, the reduction of risks)
against its cost (that is, the disagreeability of requiring oneself to pay
attention to potential risks). In this way, some "mindfulness" can be
found in otherwise "mindless" conduct.
However, the element of rationality that can be so identified does
have a rather special character. Most people do not abide by general
attention decisions consciously rendered; when we do attempt such
deliberate decisions they usually turn out to be meaningless New Year's
resolutions. If there are any general attention decisions, they occur at a
subconscious level. And when the inquiry extends into the subcon-
scious, the very notion of "decision" becomes inaccurate; the most that
can be said is that the attention problem is "dealt with" by the sub-
conscious, and that a person's behavior can perhaps be evaluated "as
if" a decision had been made.
Thus the preliminary finding of mindfulness in seemingly mindless
conduct turns out to be attenuated-and attenuated in ways that carry
significant implications for the deterrence rationale of a contributory
negligence rule. An initial implication is that if the plaintiff's conduct,
which immediately seems "unreasonable," can be understood as "rea-
sonable" after all from a longer and more appropriate vantage point,
then perhaps many of the law's contributory negligence findings are
shortsighted and incorrect.96 The broader implication is that human
conduct that is determined by some subconscious process is the least
likely to be governed by the narrowly rational influence of a liability
rule like contributory negligence. It would be groundless to contend
that a contributory negligence rule can have no effect on conduct of this
sort; but there is good reason to conclude that this effect is partial and
erratic.
Separate consideration has been given above to victim conduct that
is deliberately risky and to that which is inadvertently risky. Yet the
ensuing evaluations tend to converge. In either case, the results are
reached, first, that some of this conduct perhaps should not be deterred
after all, despite its appearance of "unreasonableness," and, second,
96. Cf. C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 179-80 (1970) (in light of appreciable risk,
driving to store for trivial purpose could be called unreasonable, but this would unduly
disparage man's capacity for enjoying life's trivial pleasures).
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that the deterrent potential of a contributory negligence rule is
significantly limited. These evaluations, taken together, may confirm
the "weak" economic argument that a contributory negligence rule has
some consequence on the frequency of unreasonably risky conduct. But
they fall short of verifying the "strong" economic argument that such a
rule can control this conduct in a general, systematic way.
Empirical support for these evaluations can perhaps be found in the
American experience with workers' injuries. A large-if somewhat un-
certain-percentage of all such injuries is due, at least in part, to the
worker's unreasonably risky conduct,9 7 and much of that conduct is of
the inattentive or inadvertent variety. Prior to workers' compensation,
all such unreasonable conduct constituted contributory negligence,
which barred the worker's tort suit against a negligent employer. More-
over, absent employer negligence, tort law withheld from the employee
any claim for compensation. After workers' compensation, the worker's
unreasonable conduct became irrelevant to his right to recover. More-
over, the worker was guaranteed a recovery regardless of his employer's
negligence. If contributorily negligent conduct can be understood in
wholly rational terms and if it is constrained in a meaningful way by a
contributory negligence rule, the advent of workers' compensation
should have occasioned a major outbreak of such carelessness. 98 In-
stead, the industrial accident rate declined sharply in the years after
the adoption of workers' compensation. Whatever the causes of this
decline,1 00 it seems clear that the elimination of the contributory
negligence defense and the provision of automatic compensation did
not result in any significant increase in the frequency of employee care-
lessness.
97. Estimates-and terminology-vary widely. According to Atiyah, 24% of all fatal
work accidents in one study were "preventable" by the worker alone, and another 16%
were preventable by both the worker and the employer (or another employee). P. ATIYAH,
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 230 (1st ed. 1970). According to Larson, 29% of
all work accidents are caused by the sole negligence of the injured worker, and an addi-
tional 5% by the joint negligence of the worker and the employer. 1 A. LARSON, supra
note 13, § 4.30 at 27. Professor Heinrich has concluded that 88% of all work accidents are
due to the "unsafe acts of persons," which are "preventable." H. HEINRICH, INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT PREVENTION 20-21 (4th ed. 1959). Apparently, in the vast majority of these ac-
cidents, the unsafe act is that of the victim himself, rather than that of a fellow worker.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 13, § 4.30, at 27.
98. There is one offsetting consideration. Prior to workers' compensation, the em-
ployee who was free of contributory negligence could recover pain and suffering damages
against a negligent employer, damages that are not now available under workers' com-
pensation even when the employer has been negligent.
99. See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 207-09 (1954).
100. Compare W. DODD, ADMINIsTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 698 (1936) with
Chelius, supra note 23, at 301-06.
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D. Prevention of Contributory Negligence by the Defendant
The fourth reason for doubting the safety-incentive rationale is this:
at least in some situations, the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct may
effectively be prevented by the defendant. Indeed, given the elements
of plaintiff psychology described above, the defendant may well be
better able than the plaintiff to prevent conduct of this sort. This is
most clearly true in the employment context.' 0 ' The employee who
is not wearing his eye goggles might well wear them if he were more
sternly instructed to do so by his supervisor.102 Or it may be that the
goggles fit uncomfortably and that he would quite voluntarily wear a
more comfortable pair were the employer to provide them. 0 3 Employee
inattentiveness is produced, in part, by fatigue, and fatigue is, in turn,
the consequence of working conditions that are established by the em-
ployer, including, for example, the speed of the assembly line 04 and
the employer's requirements for overtime. 0 The employee is, after all,
under the employer's legal control; by imaginative management and
supervision, the employer can eliminate a large percentage of its em-
ployees' careless acts. 0 6
Products liability is another area in which the defendant may be able
to exert some control over the victim's accident-causing conduct 07
The manufacturer can issue strong warnings concerning product use
and can design products in ways that reduce the opportunities for care-
less injuries. The manufacturer's leverage over the consumer is vastly
101. Negligence suits brought by employees against employers constitute the largest
single class of cases tried in the High Court in England. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 16, at
200. A workers' compensation system exists, but it does not preclude the employee's tort
suit against the employer. If the employee recovers from the employer in tort, he is
merely required to surrender one-half of his workers' compensation entitlement. Workers'
compensation payments come not from the employer or its insurer, but rather from the
national government. The government program is financed by Social Security-like taxes on
employers and employees. See generally F. BAT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 420-
602 (1967).
102. See Bux v. Slough Metals Ltd., [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1358 (C.A.) (holding employer
negligent for failure to provide adequate eye-goggle instruction). See also I.T.O. Corp. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 540 F.2d 543 (lst Cir. 1976).
103. See H. HEINRICH, supra note 97, at 36-37.
104. See Oi, Workmen's Compensation & Industrial Safety, I SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws 41, 77 (1973).
105. See A. HALE & M. HALE, supra note 74, at 47.
106. See H. HEINRICH, supra note 97, at 400; Miaumi, Action Research on the Develop-
ment of Leadership Decision Making Processes and Organizational Performance in a
Japanese Shipyard, 18 PSYCHOLOGIA 187 (1975) (suggesting that 60% of accidents caused by
employee carelessness could be prevented by tighter supervision). See also J. PAGE & M.
O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 145-49 (1973) (describing management campaigns to discourage
carelessness).
107. This may be what Professor Calabresi means to say in one cryptic passage. Cala-
bresi & Hirschoff, supra note 36, at 1060 n.19. See Professor Posner's puzzlement. Posner,
supra note 43, at 213-14.
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less, however, than the employer's power over the employee. And in
other tort contexts, it is even less clear that the defendant is in a good
position to control the victim's unreasonable conduct. Nevertheless,
this fourth reason provides a further explanation of why the elimina-
tion of the contributory negligence defense in American workers' com-
pensation systems has not created any significant problem in accident
prevention.
Given its important goal, the safety incentive rationale for a contrib-
utory negligence defense should be taken seriously. This article has
developed several reasons, however, that cast doubt on the idea that a
contributory negligence defense can be successful in achieving its ap-
propriate safety objectives. If these reasons are considered individually,
none of them refutes the safety rationale entirely. When taken in com-
bination, however, my view is that they deprive that rationale of just
about all of its credibility. Indeed, the last two of these reasons, con-
cerned with plaintiff and defendant psychology, suggest that the con-
tributory negligence defense in its traditional form is probably counter-
productive: 08 if the plaintiff's contributory negligence is often beyond
his own control and is sometimes within the defendant's control, then
the traditional rule seems less capable of achieving tort law's safety
purposes than a direct, unencumbered rule of the defendant's negli-
gence liability. 00 In sum, there is inadequate reason to believe that any
contributory negligence rule is a good idea in safety terms; the tradi-
tional rule, moreover, appears to be a distinctly bad idea.
III. A Fairness Justification
As argued above, economics furnishes no persuasive rationale for any
contributory negligence rule; indeed, it suggests if anything the un-
wisdom of the rule in its traditional form. Can an adequate rationale
for a contributory negligence rule be found somewhere outside eco-
nomics? A few commentators believe that efficiency should be the sole
determinant of liability rules.110 Most disagree with this view and in-
sist that appeals to other norms be given their due. Even among most
economics-oriented scholars, there is an understanding that "justice"
108. The same conclusion does not hold for such alternatives as comparative negli-
gence, which does seem capable of taking psychological considerations into account. See
the Bux case, discussed in note 102 supta and note 117 infra.
109. I am unaware of any economic writings that have supported the traditional rule.
110. E.g., Demsetz, supra note 23, at 28.
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or "fairness" is such a norm."' For me, at least, the language of justice
is well suited to larger questions of societal organization, while the
language of fairness may relate to the kinds of issues that typically
arise in ordinary private litigation; accordingly, it is fairness language
that will primarily be employed below.
In fairness terms, contributory negligence starts out with a clear in-
tuitive appeal. If the defendant is being held liable because of his
"faulty," "unreasonable," or "wrongful" behavior, the fact that the
plaintiff himself has likewise been guilty of "faulty" conduct seems
clearly something that the law should take into account, either by
reducing the plaintiff's damages 1 2 or by entirely denying the plaintiff's
right to sue on the theory that a faulty plaintiff should not be heard to
complain about a defendant's fault. For the law to fail totally to take
the plaintiff's conduct into account would seem unfair because it would
involve an uneven application of the fault standard.113
What this obvious argument in defense of a contributory negligence
rule rests on is the moral equivalency of the plaintiff's and defendant's
"fault." But the appearance of this equivalency is quite misleading.
The objectively egoistical or antisocial character of the defendant's
negligence has been described above." 4 With contributory negligence,
however, the conduct in question is conduct that runs an unjustified
risk to the actor himself, rather than to others.1" Given this difference,
the conduct that establishes contributory negligence cannot be re-
garded as egoistical or antisocial; instead it is behavior that, from the
actor's or others' perspective, is merely foolish"16 or stupid. This as-
sessment undermines the supposed moral parity between the "fault"
of negligence and the "fault" of contributory negligence. 1 7 Foolish
111. E.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 43, at 24-26. See also Posner, supra note 26, at 777.
112. "Liability in proportion to fault" is the slogan of sorts for comparative negligence.
See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862
(1975).
113. See Nucci v. warshaw Constr. Co., 12 N.Y.2d 16, 186 N.E.2d 401, 234 N.Y.S.2d 196
(1962); Meade v. Sanders, 151 Va. 636, 144 S.E. 711 (1928); P. ATIYAI, supra note 16, at
133, 135.
114. See pp. 701-02 & notes 29-33 supra.
115. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 418.
116. E.g., Shade v. Bay Counties Power Co., 152 Cal. 10, 13, 92 P. 62, 63 (1907)
("foolhardy"); Gibby v. East Grinstead Gas & Water Co., [1944] 1 All E.R. 358, 360 (C.A.)
("an act of folly").
117. Existing law, in various limited ways, is responsive to the view of contributory
negligence put forward here. The law is rather gentle, for example, in dealing with
plaintiffs who have been merely "momentarily inadvertent" or "momentarily inattentive"
as they approach a known or visible hazard. See note 94 supra. In comparative negligence
jurisdictions, plaintiffs tend to fare quite well in the reduction of damages when their
unreasonable conduct is merely foolish in the sense described. See, e.g., Bux v. Slough
Metals Ltd., [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1358 (C..A.). In particular, pedestrians typically suffer only a
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behavior is of course disadvantageous to the actor, but it is difficult
to identify any clear moral principle that it contravenes; 118 the lan-
guage of "wrongfulness" seems largely out of place in the contributory
negligence context. To state the matter in the formal legal parlance of
Lord Denning, "negligence depends on a breach of duty, whereas con-
tributory negligence does not."" 9
Thus the standard fairness argument adduced in support of a con-
tributory negligence rule, depending as it does on the supposed
equivalence of the plaintiff's and defendant's fault, does not deserve to
be accepted. There are, however, two other fairness considerations that
may support some contributory negligence rule.
The first of these builds on the fact that contributory negligence,
though defined in terms of an unreasonable risk to self, involves con-
duct that in an individual case may also run an unreasonable risk to
others. If so, such conduct involves elements of negligence as well as
contributory negligence. Although such an overlap between negligence
and contributory negligence is technically fortuitous, 20 in the real
world it can occur, and it does occur regularly in one major class of
accidents: those involving motor vehicles. The motorist who drives at
night without lights creates an unreasonable risk to himself and to
others at the same time. 21 When the plaintiff is suing a negligent
defendant and when the plaintiff's conduct was itself negligent in the
sense of running an unreasonable risk to others, it could be argued that
a fair application of the fault principle requires the recognition of an
affirmative defense. The defense in question would be one that asserts
the plaintiff's negligence, rather than his contributory negligence, as a
limit on the plaintiff's own negligence claim.
small reduction in damages in their suits against negligent motorists, see Fleming, supra
note 5, at 249. One can even cast an eye at workers' compensation: the carelessness of the
worker, which the law ignores, is generally misbehavior threatening the worker alone. It
is true that in a number of jurisdictions, the worker's recovery is either reduced or
eliminated if he has wilfully failed to observe a safety rule. IA A. LARSON, supra note 13,
§ 33.00. In such cases, however, the worker's conduct is morally improper in the special
sense that it implicates him in the disobedience of authority.
118. Some religions find acts of intentional self-destruction morally objectionable on
grounds that they violate God's rights in the individual-a belief not applied to accidental
harms. One can also imagine a moral complaint about foolish acts of contributory negli-
gence as impugning the high moral value that all persons should place upon human
welfare, even their own. In my view, such a moral objection is too uncertain and slender
to serve as the predicate for an official liability rule.
119. Froom v. Butcher, [1975] 3 W.L.R. 379, 383 (C.A.). See generally Honor6, Causa-
tion and Remoteness of Damage, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIvE LAW
99-101 (1969).
120. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 418.
121. See Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920).
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Although the somewhat novel idea of a negligence defense12 2 is not
without some initial appeal, when examined more carefully the idea is
not persuasive. Assume a person whose conduct involves both negli-
gence and contributory negligence. The most direct and appropriate
way to respond to the negligence in his conduct is to render him liable
in tort for any injury to another that his negligence produces. And this,
of course, is a liability that tort law does firmly impose. Given this un-
questioned negligence liability, it would entail an inappropriate form
of double-counting for the law to go farther by relying on the negligent
aspect of the person's conduct as a reason for disparaging his recovery
for an injury that he has suffered as a result of some other person's
negligence. Putting the matter in causal terms, even if the victim's con-
duct has contained a negligent aspect, it is not this aspect of his conduct
that has caused his own injury.12 3
The second fairness consideration in favor of a contributory negli-
gence defense begins with a distinction between our evaluation of the
plaintiff's original conduct and our evaluation of the issues in his
eventual lawsuit. With respect to a tort defendant, it is now widely
agreed that even if the defendant's conduct has not been morally im-
proper, there may be sufficient reasons of fairness to hold him liable
for the harm that his conduct has occasioned.12 - This basic, correct
distinction between the moral aspects of original conduct and the fair-
ness aspects of the consequent lawsuit applies on the plaintiff's side as
well. The plaintiff's original act of contributory negligence may not
have been morally improper, since it created a risk only to the plaintiff
himself. When that risk eventuates in an injury to the plaintiff, how-
ever, and when the plaintiff then seeks to collect in tort for that injury
against a negligent defendant, at the time of this lawsuit the harm in-
volved in the plaintiff's original conduct "reaches" the defendant,
another person. The defendant, concededly, has engaged in negligent
conduct that has contributed to the plaintiff's accident. Nevertheless,
that accident would never have occurred had the plaintiff himself not
behaved in a foolish way. In these circumstances, it would be basically
122. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), the origin of the con-
tributory negligence defense, was itself a highway case, in which the plaintiff, riding his
horse "violently," clearly created a risk to others as well as to himself. But in explaining
the contributory negligence defense, the court dealt exclusively with the risk to self.
123. Cf. Fletcher, supra note 33, at 537, 548-49 : n.44 (discussing negligence.type de-
fense within framework of nonnegligence "reciprocity" liability theory). Professor Fletcher
now tells me that for causal reasons of the sort discussed in the text, he no longer supports
such a defense.
124. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 157-60; Fletcher, supra note 33, at 568-69; Keeton,
supra note 33, at 427-28.
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unfair 2 i for the law to ignore entirely the plaintiff's conduct by im-
posing full liability on the negligent defendant. 126
If this idea of fairness thus calls on tort law to take some account of
the plaintiff's contributory negligence in ascertaining the liability of
a negligent defendant, the question arises of what appropriate form the
legal doctrine should assume. As presented, the fairness idea is entirely
satisfied by a liability-dividing rule like comparative negligence. Should
the idea be carried further, however, so as to disqualify the foolish
plaintiff from receiving any recovery from a negligent defendant?127
The contributory negligence idea does not seem to be one of those that
presses itself to its logical extremes;' 28 when stated as above, in a
moderate form, the idea is both intelligible and stable. There is nothing
in its logic that would be impaired or compromised were it deployed
in support of a liability-reducing rule rather than a liability-denying
rule. Moreover, as we have seen, the rule of negligence liability itself
has a satisfactory moral basis, one that is based on our disapproval of
antisocial or egoistical conduct. 129 To negate altogether a plaintiff's
lawsuit against a negligent defendant would be to allow the fairness
idea associated with the contributory negligence defense to extinguish
the moral idea that predicates negligence liability.
The law frequently encounters tension between alternative prin-
ciples. Occasionally, the law concludes that one of the principles simply
is much more important than the other, or that since the tension be-
tween the principles entails an outright conflict, one of them should
125. Cf. E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949) (arguing that it is easier to recognize
instances of "injustice" than to prescribe general, affirmative rules of "justice").
126. This finding of unfairness arises from a commonsense judgment, rather than
being deduced from any comprehensive fairness principle. When such principles are
ventured, they are typically expressed in general terms that are quite without relevance to
particular tort issues like contributory negligence. See, e.g., J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
114-17 (1971) ("duty not to harm or injure others" is fundamental to principle of justice).
Most people rely on commonsense moral judgments most of the time; even the notion that
economic fefficiency is in the public interest can be justified only in a commonsense way.
See also Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 318 (1914) (in-
sisting that all doctrines within negligence system "respond to the test of common sense").
Since, however, commonsense judgments do not carry the power of deductive proof, the
article's analysis can be understood as proposing and recommending to its readers a certain
justification for a contributory negligence defense. See the discussion of consensus-seeking
in Feinberg, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 1004, 1018-21 (1972).
127. The reasoning of the California Supreme Court on this important fairness issue is
scant and inadequate. The court merely quotes Prosser to the effect that the "clean
hands" rationale for the traditional rule "is no explanation of the many cases, particularly
those of the last clear chance, in which a plaintiff clearly at fault is permitted to recover."
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811 n.4, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231 n.4, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
863 n.4 (1975) (quoting Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1953)).
128. Cf. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (on tendency of
legal rights to extend themselves absolutely).
129. See pp. 701-02 & notes 29-33 supra.
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be vindicated even at the other's total expense. When possible, how-
ever, the law's preferred course is to seek an accommodating rule or
result that is able to reduce, or if possible to resolve, the original ten-
sion. In the contributory negligence context, a liability-dividing rule
like comparative negligence is one obvious form of accommodation or
reconciliation. The fairness idea behind contributory negligence is not
clearly superior to the moral idea supporting negligence liability, and,
as indicated, those ideas can quite properly be stated in terms that
avoid any element of necessary conflict. That American juries, in-
structed on the traditional rule, have so clearly striven in a liability-
dividing direction 130 and that virtually every other common law and
civil law jurisdiction has adopted some form of comparative negli-
gence' 31 are elements that can be taken at least somewhat into account
in reassuring ourselves of the fairness of a liability-dividing rule.
There is, moreover, another factor. The earlier discussion of tort
law's safety objective concluded that, while it was not clear that any
contributory negligence rule is an effective technique for accident
prevention, there are important psychological considerations indicat-
ing that the traditional contributory negligence rule is peculiarly
likely to be counterproductive. 32 By now, the appropriateness of some
contributory negligence rule has been affirmed on fairness grounds,
and considerations of fairness have been seen to suggest a preference
for a liability-dividing rule over the traditional rule. At this stage, the
earlier accident-prevention conclusion can be introduced for purposes
of reinforcing this suggested preference. Lurking in the background is
the vexing question of whether the accident-prevention goal can ever
justify a legal rule that would otherwise be regarded as unfair. That
question can remain quite in the background, since accident-prevention
considerations are here being employed to support a liability-dividing
result that is independently supported by fairness values.
Assuming, then, the advisability of a liability-dividing rule, which
version of such a rule is the most appropriate? The basic choice is ap-
parently between comparative negligence and Galena (which entails the
division of liability, but only in a rather aggregate manner). Since
Galena would allow certain plaintiffs to recover all their damages
despite their contributory negligence, while other plaintiffs would
recover nothing despite the defendants' negligence, it raises something
130. See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. RFV. 463, 506
(1962).
131. The United States has been "the last hold-out." Fleming, supra note 5, at 242.
132. See p. 721 supra.
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of a fairness problem. But more than that, one becomes very uncom-
fortable with the fairness implications of Galena's "break-point" fea-
ture-the feature that allows the entire liability to turn on a slight dif-
ference in the assessed negligence of the parties. To distinguish in an
all-or-nothing way between the party, whether plaintiff or defendant,
who is deemed forty-five percent negligent and the party who is deemed
fifty-five percent negligent is substantially unfair-especially when the
relevant judgments are imprecisely and unpredictably rendered after
the event by an ad hoc lay jury.133 The risk of treating basically equal
litigants in a dramatically unequal manner is simply too great. More-
over, the breakpoint creates a certain prospect of inefficient accident
prevention. That feature exacerbates three of the problems already
mentioned-each party's inability to know the other party's situation,
the parties' possible inability to make the relevant quantifications, and
the inherent uncertainty of the jury's findings.134 A rule that divides
liability within each case eliminates both the fairness and the accident-
preventibn problems that accompany the breakpoint. Thus for reasons
of fairness, reinforced by our concern for safety, the liability-dividing
rule of comparative negligence seems clearly preferable to Galdna.
Conclusion
In light of all the complicating circumstances, a contributory negli-
gence defense cannot affirmatively be justified by economic reasoning
relating to efficient accident prevention. Indeed, in encountering the
contributory negligence problem, the economic model of human con-
duct discernibly falters. The most persuasive justification for a con-
tributory negligence defense is to be found in notions of fairness. The
fairness reasoning, which is more subtle than many have supposed, is
concerned with the implications that should be drawn from the foolish-
ness of the victim's conduct. Somewhat supported by psychological con-
siderations pertaining to the goal of accident prevention, the fairness
criterion establishes a preference for a liability-dividing rule rather
than the traditional rule and, among liability-dividing rules, for com-
parative negligence rather than Galena. Comparative negligence is thus
the proper rule.
133. Modified comparative negligence, as an amalgam of Galena and pure comparative
negligence, contains a Galena-type breakpoint. The arbitrary results that this breakpoint
produces are commented on in W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 438.
134. See p. 709 & note 52 supra. For example, assume both parties know that each of
their prevention costs is in the vicinity of S30; under Galena, given its all-or-nothing
character, what they know leaves them extremely uncertain as to their potential liability.
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